William Judson and Donna Judson, husband and wife v. Wheeler RV Law Vegas, LLC a Nevada Foreign limited liability company, dba Wheeler\u27s Las Vegas RV : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
William Judson and Donna Judson, husband and
wife v. Wheeler RV Law Vegas, LLC a Nevada
Foreign limited liability company, dba Wheeler's
Las Vegas RV : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary G. Kuhlmann; Gary G. Kuhlmann & Associates, PC; Attorneys for Appellees.
Steven R. Bangerter; William E. Frazier; Daniel P. Wilde; Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter;
Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Judson v. Wheeler RV, No. 20080688 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1100
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
Appellate Case No.: 20080688-CA 
APPEAL 
vs. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a 
Nevada foreign limited liability 
company, dba WHEELER'S LAS 
VEGAS RV, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant/Appellant. 
GARY G. KUHLMANN (#4994) 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & 
ASSOCIATES, PC 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellees 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, UT 84791 
Telephone: (435) 656-6156 
Facsimile: (435) 634-1398 
STEVEN R. BANGERTER (# 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (# 11447) 
DANIEL P. WILDE (# 11800) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R 
BANGERTER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
HLibL 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT5 
JAN 2 8 2008 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC . a 
Nevada foreign limited liability 
company, dba WHEELER'S LAS 
VEGAS RV, 
Appellate Case No.: 20080688-CA 
APPEAL 
PPELL v \ ; 'S REPLY BRIEF 
Utah Cour; o; Appeals 
Defendant/Appellant. 
GARY G. KUHLMANN (#4994) 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & 
ASSOCIATES, PC 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellees 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, UT 84791 
Telephone: (435) 656-6156 
Facsimile: (435) 634-1398 
STEVEN R. BANGERTER (# 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (# 11447) 
DANIEL P. WILDE (# 11800) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R 
BANGERTER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3-4 
ARGUMENT . . . 5 
A. THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY 
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS CONSISTENTLY 
DISPUTED IN PERSONAM JUSRIDICTION BEGINNING 
WITH ITS FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE CASE 5 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS OBTAINED 
THROUGH MISTAKE, INADVERTANCE, SURPRISE, AND/OR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 9 
C. DEFENDANT'S TIMELY FILING OF THE MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT NEGATES THE PROPOSITION 
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED 14 
D. DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
WHICH, IF PROVEN, WOULD RESULT IN A JUDGMENT 
DIFFERENT THAN THE ONE ENTERED 15 
CONCLUSION 16 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Case Law Pg. # 
Burger King v. Rudzewicz 
(1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478-482 6 
Chrysler v. Chrysler 
303 P.2d 995 (Utah 1956) 10,11, 12 
Cody v. Lowe 
2008 UT App 440,2008 Utah App LEXIS 438 14 
Hanson v. Denckla 
(1958) 357 U.S. 235,253 6 
Helgesen v. Inyangumia 
636 P.2d 1079,1981 Utah LEXIS 885 .13, 14 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 
(1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 6 
Lund v. Brown 
2000 UT 75,1J29, 11 P.3d 277 16 
Murdock v. Blake 
26 Utah 2d 22,484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971) 15 
Pacer Sport and Cycle. Inc. v. Myers 
534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975) 10, 11 
State v. All Real Property at 736 N. Colo. St. 
2005 UT 90,1fll, 127 P.3d 693 5, 15 
State v. 736 N. Colo. St. 
2004 UT App 232 , \1, 95 P.3d 1211 5, 15 
State v. Musselman 
667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stevens v. Collar 
837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 
(1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 
Statutes 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY RAISED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAS CONSISTENTLY DISPUTED IN PERSONAM 
JUSRIDICTION BEGINNING WITH ITS FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE 
CASE 
As stated in Defendant's appellate brief, at the outset of this case, and in 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Defendant disputed in personam 
jurisdiction. Defendant's first filing in the trial court was its Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment and Request for Hearing. (Record, pp. 30-33.) Plaintiff has argued that 
Defendant's claims regarding the trial court's lack of personal jurisdiction are waived due 
to Defendant's failure to file a Rule 12(b) Motion for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
(Appellee's Brief at pp. 10-11.) However, it is not requisite that a Rule 12(b) Motion be 
filed to preserve that defense. This Court has implied that a 60(b) Motion to Set Aside a 
Default Judgment is permissible as a first pleading, and if raised therein, the issue of lack 
of personal jurisdiction is preserved for appeal. State v. 736 N. Colo. St., 2004 UT App 
232 , f7, 95 P.3d 1211; State v. All Real Property at 736 N. Colo. St.. 2005 UT 90, ^[11, 
127P.3d693. 
As a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment is a valid method of preserving an 
issue for appeal, the following analysis will show that Defendant's 60(b) Motion and 
supporting documents, did, in fact, preserve the issue of personal jurisdiction for appeal. 
In its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Defendant stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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< 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal 
jurisdiction. Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the 
proper party, and that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant is highly questionable under the seminal cases of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297, Hanson v. 
Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 253, and Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 
471 U.S. 462, 478-482 and their progeny. Each of the aforementioned cases 
support Defendant's position that personal jurisdiction is lacking in this 
matter due to the lack of purposeful availment and significant contacts with 
the forum state. 
(See pg. 33 of the Record.) As shown, Defendant, beginning with its first filing, has 
disputed personal jurisdiction. Additionally, despite Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendant 
failed to raise the issue of personal jurisdiction prior to, or during the hearing on the 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment (See Appellees' Brief, pg. 8), Defendant did, 
in fact, raise this issue in the hearing on the matter. (Record, pp. 85-101.) As support for 
their faulty assertion, Plaintiffs correctly point out that Defendant failed to attach 
transcripts of that hearing. However, Plaintiffs' counsel's averment is deceitful in that he 
was present at that hearing and has full knowledge that no Court Reporter was present to 
record the proceedings of that hearing. Regardless, Defendant summarized the record 
through its Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(G), 
and Plaintiffs never opposed Defendant's characterization. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 (g) states: 
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was 
made.. .the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. 
The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve 
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The 
statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be 
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled 
6 
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and approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the 
record on appeal. 
Here, Defendant served and filed its Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(g) on or about July 25, 2008. Plaintiff failed to object to 
that Statement or to propose amendments thereto. Thus, the clerk of the trial court 
appropriately included it in the record on appeal. (See pp. 85-101 of the record.) The 
Statement of Evidence states that "it was argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction 
over Defendant. As briefed, Defendant has no meaningful or significant contacts with the 
state of Utah, and does not purposefully avail itself to the benefits of the laws of the state 
of Utah. Defendant does not advertise or otherwise maintain a presence in the state of 
Utah." (See pg. 86 of the record.) As stated above, Defendant/Appellant's Statement of 
Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 (g) was not objected to by 
Plaintiff. Thus, as stated in Rule 11(g), it is now settled and approved and a part of the 
record on appeal. Plaintiffs argument that the issue of personal jurisdiction was not 
raised in the trial court, nor preserved for appeal, is wholly without merit. 
Plaintiffs have also alleged that Defendant failed, in its Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, to include a single fact disputing personal jurisdiction. (Appellees' 
Brief, pg. 9.) However, Defendant's Motion, along with the Affidavits filed in support of 
the Motion, Defendant's [Proposed] Order, and Defendant/Appellant's Statement of 
Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g), which identifies the 
arguments raised at the hearing on the Motion, clearly indicate Defendant's intent not to 
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( 
submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court. In this regard, the following statements are 
illustrative: 
(1) In the Affidavit of Sharon Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default, Ms. Nelson indicated that Defendant operates its business in Nevada, 
while Plaintiffs reside in Utah. (See pg. 39 of the record, ^ [ 16.) Further, Defendant does 
not purposefully avail itself to the benefits and laws of the state of Utah. (See pg. 39 of 
the record, ^ | 16.) As general counsel for Defendant, Ms. Nelson's affidavit is evidence of 
the lack of any activities or otherwise that would give rise to personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant; and 
(2) Defendant/Appellant's Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 11(g), as noted above, states, among other things, that "Defendant 
does not advertise or otherwise maintain a presence in the state of Utah." 
Additionally, Defendant's [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default, which was discarded by the trial court upon its signing of Plaintiffs' 
[Proposed] Order (See Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, pg. 2), plainly shows that 
Defendant sought to Set Aside the Default Judgment on the grounds that the trial court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. In this regard, Defendant's [Proposed] Order 
states: "Further, Defendant has provided facts demonstrating that legal and valid defenses 
exist; namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties.'' 
A 60(b) Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment is permissible as a first pleading. 
Defendant raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in a timely-filed Motion to Set Aside 
8 
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Default Judgment, including Affidavits and a [Proposed] Order in support thereof. At the 
hearing on the matter, Defendant again raised the issue of personal jurisdiction, as 
conclusively shown by Defendant/Appellant's Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g). Thus, the issue of whether the trial court had personal 
jurisdiction over Defendant was preserved for this appeal. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS OBTAINED THROUGH 
MISTAKE, INADVERTANCE, SURPRISE, AND/OR EXCUSABLE 
NEGLECT 
As discussed above, Defendant properly objected to the trial court's assumption of 
personal jurisdiction. However, in the event this Court finds that Defendant failed to 
properly object to the trial court's in personam jurisdiction over Defendant, such failure 
to properly object should be excused due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise and/or 
excusable neglect. 
As stated in Defendant's Appellate Brief, the trial court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was in error as the Default Judgment was obtained 
through mistake, surprise, and the excusable neglect of Defendant. Plaintiff, however, 
argues that Defendant has failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. (See Appellees' Brief, pg. 12-15.) In this regard, Plaintiff claims that "both the 
affidavits of defendant's general counsel, Sharon Nelson, and the affidavit of plaintiffs' 
counsel, Gary Kuhlman, show that prior to the entry of default, there was a total of five 
contacts between counsel's offices," (See Appellees' Brief, pg. 13) and that, as such, 
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Defendant did not file the Motion to Set Aside the Default in good faith or with "clean 
hands". Such is not the case, as will be demonstrated below. 
In Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (Utah 1956), cited by Plaintiffs in support of 
their proposition, the plaintiff filed a divorce action in the state of Utah. Subsequently, an 
order to show cause was served upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to appear in 
response, but instead went to Nevada and initiated the same action. Id. at 996. Then, both 
plaintiff and his counsel failed to appear at the trial in the Utah case or at the subsequent 
hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment in Utah. Id. at 996. The Utah 
court stated that this conduct negates a prime requisite for the granting of a Motion to Set 
Aside a Default Judgment, that the movant come to court with clean hands and in good 
faith. Id at 997. The court supported its ruling by stating the following: 
Plaintiff initially sought relief before the Utah court, but when he 
found a contest there, he fled from it and has tried by devious conduct 
to circumvent the effects of the action he commenced and to defeat 
the jurisdiction of the court from which he now seeks consideration. 
Inconsistent with any bona fide intent to pursue the action in the Utah 
court and abide by its judgment are: his failure to appear when he was 
served with an order to show cause; his departure from the state; his 
purported establishment of residence in Nevada; his filing of a new 
action for divorce there; his deliberate choice to see the Nevada action 
through and take a judgment even after notice that the Utah court had 
rendered a judgment in the action he had initiated; his indifference to 
the Utah decree for more than two months after it was entered; his 
failure to appear personally on the motion to set aside the judgment, 
and finally, his rejection of the trial court's request that he set aside the 
Nevada proceeding and then submit the matter to the Utah court. 
Id. at 997. In Pacer Sport and Cycle. Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975), also cited 
by Plaintiffs, the defendant took no further action to show that plaintiff had sued the 
10 
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wrong party or to attempt to resolve the allegations in the complaint. Such is obviously 
not the case in the action at hand. Here, Defendant took numerous steps to show that the 
Plaintiffs had sued the wrong party, and to resolve the issue with Plaintiffs, as will be 
shown below. 
In this action, the conduct of Defendant falls significantly short of the bad faith 
conduct by the plaintiff in Chrysler and the lack of action by Defendant in Pacer Sport 
and Cycle. In this regard, Defendant attempted, from the beginning, to show Plaintiffs 
that it was the wrong party to this action. After being granted an open extension within 
which to answer the Complaint, the parties began a dialogue to deteraiine who the proper 
defendant in the action was. Defense counsel believed that the issue was still in the 
process of resolution when Defendant was served with the Notice of Entry of Default. 
Regarding the amount of contact between the parties in an attempt to resolve the 
issue of the proper parties to the suit, the affidavit of Sharon Nelson indicates that she 
first contacted Plaintiffs' counsel sometime in the fall of 2007. (Addendum 3, pg. 2, [^4 to 
Defendant's Appellate Brief.) Based upon the conversation, certain documents were 
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel and an agreement was reached as to an open extension in 
which to answer the complaint. (Addendum 3, pg. 2, ^ [5 to Plaintiffs Defendant's Brief.) 
Mr. Kuhlman advised Ms. Nelson that she should provide the documents or file an 
answer. (Addendum A, pg. 2, [^5 to Plaintiffs Appellate Brief.) Ms. Nelson provided 
certain documentation, leaving open the extension within which to file an answer. 
(Addendum 3, pg. 2, [^5 to Defendant's Appellate Brief; Addendum A, pg. 2, |^6 to 
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Plaintiffs Appellate Brief.) Later that day, Plaintiffs' counsel demanded more 
information. (Addendum 3, pg. 2, ^ 6 to Defendant's Appellate Brief; Addendum A, pg. 
2, ^ 7 to Plaintiffs Appellate Brief.) On November 1, 2007, Ms. Nelson sent a second fax 
requiring that Mr. Kuhlman sign a confidentiality agreement. (Addendum A, pg. 2, ^ |8 to 
Plaintiffs Appellate Brief.) Ms. Nelson then indicates that she continued to speak with 
Plaintiffs' counsel. (Addendum 3, pg. 2, ^ [7 to Defendant's Appellate Brief.) On 
November 27, 2007, without any email, fax or telephone notice, Mr. Kuhlman mailed an 
Application for Entry of Default to Defendant's counsel. (Addendum A, pg. 2, ^ 9 to 
Plaintiffs Appellate Brief.) Thus, Ms. Nelson and Mr. Kuhlman had at least eight 
contacts, and likely more, prior to the filing of the Notice of Entry of Default, in an effort 
to resolve the issue of which party or parties are the proper defendant(s) in this action. 
It is "generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where timely application is made and there is any reasonable 
grounds for doing so, to the end that cases may be decided on their merits. Emphasis 
added. Chrysler, supra, 303 P.2d at 996. As stated in Defendant/Appellant's Brief, 
Plaintiffs' counsel granted Sharon Nelson an open-ended extension in which to answer 
the Complaint. Ms. Nelson understood the phrase "open-ended extension" to mean that 
Defendant did not yet have to answer the Complaint until the parties resolved the issue of 
who should have been sued, or at least, until Plaintiffs' counsel notified her that the 
extension of time was no longer "open". The parties then engaged in the series of 
communications regarding who was the proper defendant in the action. 
12 
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On or about November 27, 2007, without prior notification to Defendant's general 
counsel, and via mail only, Plaintiffs' counsel dispatched a Notice of Application for Entry of 
Default, knowing that the document would be subject to out-of-state mailing during a peak 
holiday mailing period, and with an intervening weekend. Defendant's counsel did not receive 
the document until approximately December 5, 2007. By that time, Plaintiffs had already taken 
a Default Judgment against Defendant, despite the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel never 
notified Defendant's general counsel that the open extension of time in which to answer 
the Complaint had been rescinded. 
In Helgesen v. Invangumia. 636 P.2d 1079, 1981 Utah LEXIS 885, the parties had 
been negotiating for settlement for five months. After the time for answering the 
complaint had expired, plaintiffs counsel filed a memorandum to support a default award 
without having contacted defendant to inform them that he was doing so. Id. The court 
held that courtesy and equity required that where a defendant had not yet filed an answer 
and believed his adversary would tell him when he would ask for judgment and defendant 
was not so advised, the defendant should not be precluded from filing an answer because 
of such default. Id. at 1081. The court said, "Common courtesy and ordinary professional 
conduct dictated that before proceeding to the court the attorney should have made 
contact with the adjuster with whom he had been dealing for so long, and to have made 
inquiry as to why an answer had not been filed." Id. at 1081. "Under the circumstances 
the adjuster had every reason to believe that he would be extended professional courtesy 
by the attorney with whom he was dealing and would hear back from him with further 
medical information. He was reasonable in believing that no default judgment would be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taken in the meantime. We therefore conclude he was not guilty of lack of diligence and 
the defendant should be relieved of his default under Rule 60(b) on account of the 
mistake and excusable neglect." Id. at 1082. 
Here, similarly, counsel for the parties were engaged in negotiations. The open 
extension to answer was never revoked or rescinded by Plaintiffs' counsel. Instead, 
Plaintiffs' counsel decided just to send to Defendant a Notice of Application for Entry of 
Default. Defendant was completely surprised by Plaintiffs' counsel's actions. (See pg. 39 of the 
record, ffif 12-13.) Plaintiff should have been estopped from entry of default due to the 
open extension of time granted to Defendant by Plaintiffs' counsel, and Plaintiffs' 
counsel's failure to timely advise Defendant, or to advise Defendant at all, of the 
rescission of his agreement to grant an open extension of time to answer the Complaint. 
Defendant was completely surprised and any neglect on its part to file an answer was 
justified and excusable due to the actions of Plaintiff. Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant 
did not act in good faith by failing to file an answer is without merit. 
C. DEFENDANT'S TIMELY FILING OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT NEGATES THE PROPOSITION THAT THE 
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED 
Plaintiff has argued that because, at the time Defendant filed its only motion (the 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment), judgment had already been granted in favor of 
Plaintiff, Defendant's failure to contest the allegations contained in the complaint before 
default resulted in the allegations being admitted. (See Appellees' Brief, pg. 10.) In 
support, Plaintiffs cite Codvv.Lowe. 2008 UT App 440,2008 Utah App LEXIS 438, 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
citing Stevens v. Collar, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Murdock v. Blake, 
26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971). These cases however, merely stand for 
the proposition that matters left uncontested are deemed admitted. Neither case identifies 
at what stage in the litigation matters are found to be uncontested. As stated above, a 
60(b) Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment is permissible as a first pleading, and if 
raised therein, the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction is preserved for appeal. State v. 
736 N. Colo. St.. 2004 UT App 232 , f7, 95 P.3d 1211; State v. All Real Property at 736 
N. Colo. St., 2005 UT 90, Tfl 1, 127 P.3d 693. Therefore, Plaintiffs' allegations that 
Defendant's failure to contest the allegations in the complaint prior to default being taken 
results in the matters being admitted, is also without merit. 
D. DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
WHICH, IF PROVEN, WOULD RESULT IN A JUDGMENT DIFFERENT 
THAN THE ONE ENTERED 
Plaintiffs' argue that, even if Defendant has established the existence of excusable 
neglect or surprise, Defendant has failed to establish the existence of a meritorious 
defense, as required for relief under Rule 60(b). (See Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 15-
16.) In citing State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), Plaintiffs attempt to show 
that Defendant's Motion and supporting Affidavits dispute the truth of Plaintiffs' 
allegations, but do not set forth specific facts which, if proven, would result in a different 
judgment than the one entered. However, as discussed above, the Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment, the Affidavit of Sharon Nelson, the [Proposed] Order, and 
Defendant/Appellant's Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
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11(g), each provide specific facts disputing personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the 
subject Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment indicates that Defendant did not own the 
subject dealership when Plaintiffs purchased the recreational vehicle. In other words, 
Plaintiffs sued the wrong party. 
The court in Lund v. Brown stated: 
Although we have never explained precisely what a party must do to 
adequately 'show' a meritorious defense, we have made it clear that a 
party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this 
standard. See Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148 (rejecting a standard 
essentially requiring that the defaulted party prove its proposed 
defense before it is eligible to have a judgment vacated). Moreover, 
we have clearly articulated the fundamental policy underlying the 
meritorious defense rule. That policy is simply to prevent the 
necessity of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face. Thus, 
where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if 
proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or 
counterclaimant, it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and 
meritorious defense for the purposes of its motion to set aside a 
default judgment. 
Lund v.Brown, 2000 UT 75, TJ29, 11 P.3d 277. Here, Defendant need not prove that 
Plaintiff has sued the wrong party in this case. Defendant need only show that, if proven 
true, the Plaintiffs suing of the wrong defendant is a meritorious defense - that it 




The Trial Court erred in failing to set aside the subject Default Judgment as 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal jurisdiction in the State of 
16 
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Utah and have sued the wrong party. These issues were preserved for appeal beginning 
with Defendant's first filing, the subject Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. The 
filing of that Motion was adequate, as a first pleading, to dispute personal jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Default Judgment was obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
and excusable neglect as Defendant's open extension in which to answer the Complaint 
was not timely rescinded, or rescinded at all, by Plaintiffs. Lastly, Defendant has 
established a meritorious defense - that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party. Thus, the 
Trial Court erred when it denied Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter 
DATED: January QX, 2009 T > - f ^ P . u 3 J ? < & ? 
DANIEL P. WILDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was mailed, 
postage prepaid on January ^ J2, 2009 to the following: 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
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